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INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY Korea

DATE DISTR. 21 May 1952

SUBJECT North Korean Plans for Forcing a Soviet Decision
on the Cease-Fire

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1. The Soviet representative (sic) in P'yongyang called a meeting for 5 May in P'yongyang to be attended by the highest North Korean political and military leaders and senior Chinese Communist representatives in North Korea. The North Korean cabinet members believe that new instructions on the P'anmunjom conference have been sent from Moscow. At the conference the North Koreans will present a detailed report on the ROK political situation which the Soviet Union had requested.
2. The North Korean government will press for a Soviet decision on the P'anmunjom conference and will request the Soviet Union to call an international conference to settle the Korean war if the Soviets do not make definite decisions on the problem. The North Korean government also prepared to submit a proposal to mount an attack immediately before the ROK elections. The North Koreans are aware that the Soviets and the Chinese Communists do not favor this action, but will suggest it to make the Soviets and Chinese Communists clarify their position.¹
3. The North Korean government would like to propose a Kaesong political conference for August 1952. The Propaganda Ministry is waiting for a signal to call for a "democratic conference for the unification of Korea."
4. Some government officials state that whatever the result of the P'yongyang conference, the North Korean government plans no significant action at P'anmunjom until 20 May.²

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- 25X1 1. [] Comment. According to [], in early April North Korean Minister of Defense CH'OE Yong-kon urged the North Koreans to support the Chinese Communist demand that an agreement at P'anmunjom be reached quickly in protest against the Soviet position. 25X1
- 25X1 2. [] Comment. [] at a Soviet-North Korean staff meeting North Korean delegates were instructed to take no action at the P'anmunjom conference until 20 May. [] 25X1
- 25X1 [] in March the North Koreans intended to delay the negotiations indefinitely, or at least until the Soviets made overtures from Moscow.

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